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With the death of North Korea leader Kim Jong-il, the level of
uncertainty will dramatically escalate in an already highly uncer-
tain market. The question becomes, is there a market opportunity
for Western organizations, and when should Western organiza-
tions attempt to enter North Korea? In addition, there is a large
question looming over the potential changes in the country, that
being, if and when reunification with South Korea will occur. This
article examines the potential of a unified market on the Korean
peninsula.
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On December 19, 2011, the aging leader of North Korea, Kim Jong-il, died of
a heart attack at the age of 69, ending the personality cult that had gripped
North Korea for the last 17 years. The aftermath of his 17-year heavy-handed
dictatorship is unclear, but Kim’s youngest son, Kim Jong-un, became the
next leader of the secretive communist state of North Korea. The outcome
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of this change in leadership in North Korea is a source of speculation
throughout the world but nowhere more closely anticipated than in South
Korea. What will the future be for these two countries: to unify or not?
INTRODUCTION
In October of 2010, a coalition of German and South Korean policymakers
assembled to seriously examine how the model of Germany’s 1990 unification
movement might be applied to the Koreas today (Homola 2010). Although
foreign policy authorities disagree on the likeliness of a complete,
Germany-style unification of the cousin states within the next 10 years, normal-
ized trade relations between the two within the next 5 years seems probable
(‘‘One Korea?’’ 2008). The complete unification of the Republic of Korea and
strategic potential due to the death of Kim Jong-il opens the door for movement
toward Korean unification in the coming years; these steps signal the potential
for a considerable, if only a hypothetical, future emerging market. How to assess
the potential of entering this emerging market is another concern entirely.
Experts have theorized that the most trusted investors in a financially
open North Korea, in this light, would be Japan, China, and South Korea
(Conforti 1999). Therefore, the promise of this potentially emerging market
after unification would have to be tied to fiscal and=or politically united
Korea. Despite the obstacles, Westerners have already begun to bridge the
Korea ‘‘gap’’ by establishing significant trade and export efforts toward
South Korea and China. Successes in China are clearly widespread; however,
North Korea, too, is already recognized as a promising yet sometimes over-
looked emerging market for foreign investment, boasting strong growth,
high value, and equally high risk (Dawson 2005). If the existing relationships
in neighboring Asian nations continue to strengthen, it is forecast that in 5 to
10 years, Americans will be ready and willing to enter North Korea through
limited strategic efforts (e.g., strategic alliances with other Asian countries;
Hwang 2010; Kerr 2005; Rosecrance 2006). Thus, American organizations
could embrace the economically deprived market in North Korean and at
the same time the United States could take competitive advantage of the
labor, land, and resources available in the previously under-developed econ-
omic platform. The strategy could ultimately be worth the risk involved; even
if a unified Korea would at first seem fiscally and politically unstable, as did
the united Germany of 1990, and the Germans today have overcome many
obstacles and achieved significant economic success (Hart-Landsberg 1996).
Indeed, Korea’s recent development in many ways mirrors a
democraticization of China’s development in the years after its reformation
and opening up to the global marketplace, making the economically unified
Koreas an attractive and very plausible market for some consumer goods.
However, as many American companies have already discovered, working with
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the established cultural and government barriers in place in many Asian
economies is no small task (Worden 2008). North Korea presents an especially
difficult case to consider, since, for all practical purposes, the nation remains and
will more than likely remain closed to the Western World for a number of years
after the projected unification (Hwang 2010; Mitchell 2002; Shambaugh 2003).
In order to enter a unified Korean market with any chance of success, it
has been suggested that interested American firms start early by establishing
stronger bases in China and South Korea in order to catch the opportunities
before it unification occurs (Mitchell 2002; Stares and Wit 2009). This may be
a very difficult strategy to implement given the present unstable economic
conditions in the United States as well as the rest of the world. By comparing
Korea’s unification to its only precedent, the existing German example, and
to the economies of other Asian nations, along with a brief examination of
the successes and strategies of Asian companies such as China’s Hai’er
(Duysters 2009), it is the intent of this article to outline a market-entry strat-
egy that would occur given a reunification of North and South Korea econ-
omically and=or politically. The fact of the matter is that U.S. companies as
well as the government would need to act quickly and preemptively in order
to be a viable competitor in a new, unified Korean economy. In addition, the
level of commitment to South Korea over the last 50 years requires the United
States to play an integral role in unification if that is the direction that evolves
out of this change in leadership.
NORTH KOREA: A CLIMATIC ASSESSMENT OF ITS FUTURE
Because North Korea is still an economy ‘‘closed’’ to the United States, factual
economic data and reliable information regarding the nation’s infrastructure,
development, and culture are difficult to come-by. What we know about
North Korea’s economic (Worden 2008), cultural (Chamberlin 2004), and
political environment (Hwang 2010) is drawn from the culturally similar
South Korea, data from friendly nations with trade relations in North Korea,
and intelligence gathered through the Central Intelligence Agency. Laying
out the specific attributes of North Korea as compared to its far more mod-
ernized ‘‘sister state’’ to the South can provide potential market entrants a cris-
per view of the specific problems business in the unified Koreas might face in
the future. An understanding of the current North Korean economic situation,
as compared to other countries in the region, will also aid the formulation of
market entry strategy.
Political and Economic Environment in North Korea
Concerning North Korea’s political structure, the nation is considered a
socialist developing country, with a basic market structure similar to the
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economic makeup systems of Vietnam and Cuba (Ducruet and Cheol 2008).
A comparatively low per-capita gross domestic product (GDP) and heavy
economic control through a tightly centralized government in Pyongyang
has resulted in an agrarian populace (estimated to be up to 80% of the popu-
lation) susceptible to famine and drought (Central Intelligence Agency 2013;
Noland, Robinson, and Wang 2000). To outside observers, it would not be
readily apparent that the population in North Korea of poor peasant farmers
seems to lack purchasing power to acquire consumer goods. Indeed, the
standard of living in North Korea is drastically below that of South Korea,
and per-capita GDP is a mere one-seventeenth of South Korea’s (see Pink-
ston and Saunders 2003). Improvement to North Korea’s standard of living
is dependent upon attracting foreign investment from China, Russi,a and
other major trading partners (Kerr 2005). Open trade relations could also
indirectly improve having a very positive impact on the average citizen’s
standard-of-living (Mitchell 2002; Shambaugh 2003).
At first glance, North Korea at present or in the future would seem to be
the least likely venue for foreign trade. Tight government regulation, political
and economic sanctions, and a dismally poor populace all seem insurmount-
able barriers to foreign investment and entry into the pre-emerging South
Korean market. However, compared to other nations with similar economic
structures, such as Vietnam and Cuba, North Korea enjoys certain advan-
tages. According to the Transport Reviews scholarly journal, North Korea
has a ‘‘particular advantage’’ over other similarly structured political econom-
ies. North Korea’s strategic location, close to the enormous, major markets in
China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia, as well as its access to the Sea of
Japan and Pacific Ocean (Central Intelligence Agency 2013; Noland et al.
2000; Smith 2002) all provide a favorable environment for increased trade.
These advantages, however, are not utilized to their full potential in the
current North Korean trade structure. Based on somewhat tenuous data, it
appears that China and South Korea presently dominate trade in North Korea
(figure 1).
Both China and South Korea have positive trade relations with the
United States. Although China remains a nominally socialist country and both
ideologically and structurally retains certain similarities with North Korea,
plentiful trade relationships exist between China and the United States
(Rosecrance 2006; Shambaugh 2003; Smith 2002). South Korea is an
economically successful, functioning democracy with close trade ties to the
United States. In preparation for any sort of future economic unification of
the Korean states, it seems one way for a strategic oriented company to enter
an economically open North Korea would be to establish subsidiaries in
South Korea and China. Doing so would enable American personnel to gain
vital experience and insight into the Korean culture and climate as well as
work on forming trusting relationships with important Chinese and Korean
firms and businesspeople.
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The Potential of Economic Integration of North and South Korea
Many would argue that the current political-economic structure of North
Korea is anathema to substantial foreign trade. South Korea, on the other
hand, has decidedly established itself on a global scale as an exporter with
high economic growth and purchasing power parity. Combining the two cul-
turally similar yet politically different nations may result in chaos and disunity
at first, but eventually the combined economies would fuse into an emerging
market with a population twice the size of the South Korean predecessor
(Moltz 2004; Stares and Wit 2009; Stein 2002). Even more likely, since the
South Korean government would prefer that gradual economic integration
precede political unification, the two nations hypothetically may remain sep-
arate political entities yet merge their two lopsided economies into a not–
very-appealing, yet still approachable, trade market (‘‘One Korea?’’ 2008;
Young, Lee, and Zang 2000).
In any case, given the immense cultural, political, and economic barriers
in place barring trade between the existing North Korea and the United
States, one can only surmise what would happen if the United States would
decide to lift its trade sanctions on a friendlier, unified Korea (Carpenter and
Bandow 2004; Dawson 2005; Hwang 2010). Foreign business interest
ensconced in the rapidly developing South Korean market has enabled the
Asian nation to witness nearly unprecedented economic growth, and it
appears that there is a strong correlation between foreign investment and
the rapid growth already seen in China, Japan, and South Korea. This invest-
ment would have to be applied to North Korea in order to encourage the
same sort of rapid growth present in South Korea. In fact, several experts
in the field of international economics have even theorized that the foreign
FIGURE 1 Key trading partners of North Korea. Source: Central Intelligence Agency (2013)
(color figure available online).
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private sector may play a role in facilitating and strengthening Korean
economic unification (Hwang 2010; Young et al. 2000).
Investigating what forces might encourage the Koreas in the foreseeable
future either economically or politically has been fitting subject matter for
hundreds of different articles since the Korean War. Such foreign policy sub-
ject matter is outside the scope of this article’s emerging market analysis. For
the purposes of this study, let us assume that North Korea, for whatever
reasons, has decided to open trade relations with the United States, that
the United States has removed its sanctions on North Korea, and that North
Korea has joined with the stronger democracy of South Korea. If these vari-
ous requisites are in place, entrance into one united Korean emerging market
with one common Korean culture is possible for American companies
(Carpenter and Bandow 2004). However, such entry will be difficult and
time-consuming and ideally would entail certain measures of preemptive
action.
Framework for Market Entry in Centrally Controlled Markets
Based on the data previously discussed, North Korea alone seems to present
even greater barriers to Western trade than might be expected. A successful
market entry strategy into North Korea, therefore, is difficult to formulate pre-
sently, mainly because there seems to be no market in North Korea for most
of the countries in the world. A good market entry strategy for united Koreas
is even more difficult to propose, mainly because there is little to no estab-
lished precedent for the economic but not political unification of Asian states.
However, based on an analysis of some of the information previously
discussed, certain facts seem to stand out: (1) Even though political ideolo-
gies may differ, North Korea and South Korea share essentially the same cul-
tural values and beliefs (Mitchell 2002); (2) China, South Korea, and certain
other friendly nations have already successfully entered the North Korean
market and engaged in considerable trade (Shambaugh 2003); and (3) under
the present system, North Korean trade environment would appear unfavor-
able, even to the most intrepid globalization advocate. Nonetheless, trade
between even the most seemingly unfriendly nations is still possible; as
the trade graph shows, North and South Korea are reasonably civil trading
partners (Rosecrance 2006). What this means is that firms established in
South Korea, whether domestic or foreign, might have a greater chance of
breaking into a chaotic, open North Korean emerging market same form of
unification occur. Because of cultural similarities, similar entry strategies
can be applied to both Koreas under a united economy. Also, at the same
level, the Koreas do wish to present a united front to the rest of the world
for business purposes, much as ‘‘unification’’ of sorts has already occurred
in the European Union and in the ‘‘unification’’ of the many diverse
provinces of China.
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In the eyes of foreign organizations (American companies in particular),
North Korea is in a position not too far removed from the world’s most
promising developing economy. Regardless, hypothetically combining the
two Koreas possess certain aspects making them stand out as an emerging
market. North Korea’s population, if allowed the economic liberty associated
with economic unification with South Korea, would elevate the combined
Koreas into the next great emerging economy. A country with an estimated
population of 24,457,492 (Kerr 2005; Mitchell 2002), North Korea is the 48th
most populous country in the world. Add that more than 24 million to South
Korea’s population of 48,754,657 (South Korea 2011), and the combined
Koreas generate a consuming population of roughly 73 million people.
Given the small size of the Korean Peninsula, this teeming unified population
would provide a plentiful labor market, one vital component to growth in
emerging markets. Still, in order to pique the interests of foreign investors,
the population in an emerging economy needs to be able to purchase goods
and services. A large labor supply would quickly fill jobs and begin to earn
income, and subsequent demand for products would presumably follow.
Population is an important driver in emerging economies.
It is the population of this region and its potential purchasing power that
could pique the interest of those companies wishing to do business in
economically combined Koreas. Market entrants into an economically uni-
fied Korea would need to market products targeting specific sectors of the
population and would need to take into consideration the overall popula-
tion’s level of purchasing power. North and South Korea at present are
essentially dissimilar economic markets, whose consumers would have
dramatically different demands (Carpenter and Bandow 2004; Central
Intelligence Agency 2013). A North-South Korean ‘‘hybrid’’ market would
also entail a peculiar warping of the present GDP per capita in each Korea
(Nolan et al. 2000).
The purchasing power of various economically and geographically
influential nations, including North Korea, much of Asia, and the United
States, is presented in figure 2.
Figure 2 presents a comparison of the gross domestic product (GDP) per
capita in a variety of Asian nations, along with that of the United States. GDP
per capita represents the consumer purchasing power, on average, of the citi-
zens of a country. Based on this graph, it is apparent that North Korea’s GDP
per capita falls harshly below that of South Korea, Thailand, and even
Vietnam, a Southeast Asian nation with a vaguely similar market structure.
While North Korea’s per capita GDP may seem to be lagging unusually far
behind compared to that of other rapidly growing Asian countries, there is
still hope for consumer demand under a united economic system.
In fact, even at present, North Koreans still enjoy a noticeably higher
GDP per capita than people from Bangladesh ($1,700 per capita) and incred-
ibly higher than those of the subsistence-farming people in Zimbabwe ($400
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per capita) or Burundi ($300 per capita; Arrighi, Silver, and Brewer 2003;
Central Intelligence Agency 2013). While a relatively low GDP per capita
may limit the variety of goods North Koreans would be interested in purchas-
ing, North Koreans would still share the same desire to improve their quality
of life and escape abject poverty. With their current level of income, any
extra income not spent on (Haggard 2007) medical care could, perhaps, pur-
chase standardized and=or no-frills goods marketed by foreign companies.
A similar set of circumstance could be found in Vietnam after the military
struggle that took place in that country (Napier and Nguyen 2005; Nguyen and
Napier 2000). Consumers were deprived of consumer goods for nearly a dec-
ade. When the armed conflict concluded, the Vietnamese people had pent-up
demand and a rapidly growing per-capita income that could be directed at
increasing household expenditures (Napier 2005, 2006; Ralston, Nguyen,
and Napier 1999; Vu and Napier 2000a, 2000b, 2000c). Whereas the North
Korean population lacks the economic wherewithal to expand consumer
demand if reunification were to take place, the only caveat that could rectify
the lack of purchasing power is the infusion of capital by South Korea
family=friends to their northern counterparts. This inward flow of money
may provide the foundation for many North Koreas to restart the economic
activities. This was not the case in Vietnam in that both elements of the popu-
lation were deprived of the mechanism to earn money during the war.
Returning to the comparative per capita GDP graph, an additional point
of interest is that South Korea’s GDP per capita is 17 times greater than that of
North Korea. The purchasing power disparity between North and South
Korea may seem somehow insurmountable; however, combining the two
countries would combine two different GDPs (similar to the reunification
that took place in Germany), and wealth would eventually, hopefully, be dis-
persed equally between the two. While any sort of real averaging of the two
economies would take decades, a rudimentary average would place the GDP
FIGURE 2 Per capital income for comparison purposes. Country comparisons: GDP – per
capita (purchasing power parity). Source: Central Intelligence Agency (2013) (color figure
available online).
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per capita of combined Koreas at approximately $16,000 per capita—well
over the $11,200 per capita (Central Intelligence Agency 2013) world average
GDP per capita. In an ideal future for the Koreas, GDP per capita in several
decades would be well above this average, since job availability for the North
Koreans will allow per capita income in the North to increase on a multifold
basis, and South Koreans will continue to pursue economic development.
What this means is that, in the long run, economically combined Koreas have
the eventual potential to become one emerging economic powerhouse.
However, thriving or not, the combined Korean emerging market still would
present particular hindrance to successful entry on the part of Western com-
panies, especially in the realm of remaining cultural dissimilarities.
Barriers to Market Entry: Cultural Challenges
Outside of the aforementioned policies and ideological factors barring
successful trade between the United States and North Korea, language bar-
riers are also a major deterrent to business even in the friendly emerging mar-
ket of South Korea. According to some theorists, language barriers caused by
faulty translation or incorrect interpretation may cause Americans to misun-
derstand certain messages or fail to pick-up on vital linguistic nuances
(Central Intelligence Agency 2013). These misunderstandings can occur in
policy dealings and business alike. Companies wishing to do business in
the Koreas, be it North, South, or some sort of unification of the two, must
take some sort of measures to avoid misunderstandings in a culturally and
linguistically dissimilar environment. Three possible methods of countering
this form of misinterpretation are to (1) enforce language learning and
culture acclimatization programs among all Western employees prior to
any overseas departure; (2) more realistically, hire excellent translators to
interpret all business proceedings; or (3) engage in joint ventures and
strategic alliances with Korean companies (Duysters 2009; Moltz 2004).
Learning the language of the host country is one of the primary ways to
encourage trust between dissimilar cultures (Chamberlin 2004). A wise move
for companies currently in some form of business partnership with South
Korea would be to encourage Western employees to learn at least a rudimen-
tary level of Korean language. Doing so would illustrate a desire to embrace a
dramatically different culture and might gain the business some degree of
respect in the eyes of Koreans. With language-learning measures in place,
Western organizations with already established investment in South Korea
could have a strategic competitive advantage in doing business during a
potentially chaotic period during economic unification. Organizations that
already have firmly established programs of language and cultural learning
and an entrepreneurial corporate culture could gain more trust more quickly
from previously closed-off North Korean organizations. Also, a combination
of educating Western employees with employing culturally attuned
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translators and entering into joint relationships could help bridge the lan-
guage and culture gap and make certain companies utilizing such measures
comparatively more attractive than others.
Another possible way to work around cultural differences between
Western and Korean businesspeople would be to employ the help of
third-party representatives, ideally from a neighboring, friendly country with
a reasonable degree of cultural similarity. A reasonable choice for a
third-party associate to help with work in North Korea would be a Chinese
individual with some knowledge of the Korean language, since certain
aspects of Korean culture are not terribly different from those of the Chinese
(Chamberlin 2004). Because of shared roots in Taoism and Buddhism, as well
as an emphasis on Confucian thought, the Koreans and Chinese might see
each other as neutral associates who do not appear too ‘‘foreign.’’ Chinese
associates, if trustworthy, would be a fitting choice because Americans and
North and South Koreans all share workably healthy relationships with the
Chinese.
On the other hand, a less than ideal choice for a third-party associate
would be a Japanese representative. Although Japan and Korea are geo-
graphically close and a considerable amount of business interaction takes
place between the two nations, the Koreans and Japanese share a tumultuous
historical background of exploitation, violence, and distrust, and Japanese
cars are nearly impossible to find anywhere in South Korea presently.
Employing a Japanese associate would instantly alienate many tradition-
oriented Korean businesspeople, who might distrust the foreign Westerners
because of ingrained prejudice against the ‘‘untrustworthy’’ Japanese. An
imperfect alliance may be just enough to scare unified Korean businesspeo-
ple away from foreign investment and would be just one more factor work-
ing in the favor of domestic firms. Careful attention to cultural nuances and
existing bias is necessary to success in any foreign market but particularly in
the ritualistic realm of East Asia (Chamberlin 2004; Laney 2003; Park 2002).
Joint Ventures: China’s Haier as a Case Study
Joint venture in research or production has remained a hotly discussed
method of market entry in emerging markets. A few American firms have
already sought to form production or research partnerships of varying
degrees worldwide, to differing degrees of success. However, American firms
have not paid much attention to Asian attempts at globalization through joint
venture. The Chinese have successfully entered Korea through forms of joint
venture, and their example may prove the sort of partnership most trusted
and cherished in Asian thought. By allowing Korean experts into an
American company’s inner circle, listening to those experts’ advice, and ally-
ing one’s company with South Korean companies in such a way as to share
risk and jointly invest in an endeavor illustrates a high degree of mutual trust
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and acceptance. Doing so would mimic attempts by Chinese organizations
and would also cement existing relationships between Western and Korean
firms, thus giving the Western allied firm a head start upon the onset of
eventual economic unification of the Koreas.
One precedent example of joint business with local firms in tightly con-
trolled economic environments exists in China’s Haier Group. Although
Chinese-made household products have traditionally been disregarded inter-
nationally on the basis of poor quality, Haier, under new management
(Duysters 2009) made a point to pursue a policy of conforming to established
international quality standards. Because of policy change, many nations
began to seek joint venture opportunities with Haier, leading to increased
prestige on the world stage, especially in less developed countries (LDCs).
Some of these LDCs that have pursued joint production ventures with
Haier include the Philippines, Dubai, Iran, Algeria, Jordan, Pakistan, and
Bangladesh (Duysters 2009). Remember that the GDP per capita in
Bangladesh ($1,700) is similar to that of North Korea at present ($1,800).
Haier has also established shared research operations with many more-
developed countries, including Germany and South Korea.
This Haier case study is important to an examination of the Korean
emerging market because it neatly provides a precedent example of how
Asian firms would choose to go about business in Korea and shows a way
that American firms could mimic in order to enter the unified Korean market.
Not only would joint ventures with Korean partners enable American firms to
bypass certain linguistic and cultural barriers to business, but such ventures
would also forge trust with the Koreans and make foreign organizations ever
so much more likely to succeed in a hostile business environment.
Strategic Assessment to Effectively Compete in a Unified Korean
Market
If unification of South and North Korea were to occur, Western organizations
would need to assess their capabilities relative to the new opportunities pre-
sented by the consolidated market. The key elements in making such an
assessment are outlined in figure 3. Each of these stages of preparedness will
be discussed.
SOCIAL=ECONOMIC COMPARISON BETWEEN NORTH=SOUTH KOREAS (VITAL
DEMOGRAPHICS)
The foundation for effectively harvesting the unified Korean market is to gain
a clear and=or up-to-date factual insight into the consolidated market. The
problem with strategic background vital statistics is that very few (being gen-
erous) data have been collected on the population in North Korea for over 25
years. The government statistics are highly suspect, and the data collection
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infrastructure to gain data on the populous is nearly nonexistent. Therefore,
an external source of information will need to be solicited, more than likely
from a Chinese source or in some rare situations from the Russians. That
statement should illustrate how desperate Western organizations will be,
turning to China=Russia for accurate information! This input could then be
triangulated with reports from the U.S. CIA, the United Nations, and Oxfam
and other non-government organizations (NGOs). However, Western man-
agers will still have to develop a limited list of data that are needed and some
means for rationalizing the value of the information for making investment=
marketing decisions. The key to this stage of the decision process is to limit
that data to make decisions on and to collect information from a variety of
sources: the management of the organization gaining confidence in the data
being collected.
ASSESSMENT OF THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT
If unification were to occur on the Korean peninsula, the resulting govern-
ment would not resemble the one in Pyongyang or, for that matter, the
one in Seoul. The resulting hybrid would have components of both the North
FIGURE 3 Surviving=prospering in a unified Korea environment. Note. PPP: purchasing
power parity; SWOT: strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats.
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and South and elements that are contingent on the negotiations of
reunification of the two countries (Laney 2003). The assumption would be
that the South would have more ‘‘say-so’’ in the reconfiguration of the new
government entity, but this may not be the case. The rationale for that state-
ment would center on the 25 years of truculent political behavior of the North
on the world stage. It would behoove Western organizations to examine
the reunification of Germany to gain a clearer picture of what might happen
in the Korean reunification process (Hart-Landsberg 1996; Homola 2010).
The temporal issue is critical to the question of what the government
will be like once reunification were to take place. There would be a great
deal of behind the ‘‘bamboo wall’’ influence peddling transpiring, where
China will attempt to influence the ‘‘twenty-something’’ Kim Jong-un while
at the same time Park Geun-hye (South Korean president) will attempt to
negotiate with the very young Kim Jong-un. What will transpire is anyone’s
guess, but it should not assume that the North will have a significantly
weaker negotiating stance even given the delicate transition position of the
new leadership. President Lee has held a summit with China’s president,
Hu Jintao, in Beijing focused on different means to develop a strategic part-
nership between the two Koreas . . . so the process is already underway. The
main goal of the present pre-reunification may be as simple as restraining the
new leadership in the North and to build toward stability (Laney 2003). Some
form of provocation by the North is within the realm of possibilities given the
lack of experience and knowledge of the young leader.
FORECASTING NORTH KOREA’S DEMAND AS WELL AS PERSONAL PURCHASING POWER
While the first stage of this assessment process focused on a social=economic
comparison between North and South Korea, this stage of the process needs
to develop a forecasting method that will capture the present as well as
future purchasing power of the North Korean population (as well as key mar-
ket segments). The disposal personal income is the foundation of the
analysis, but it is important to recognize that other key purchasing power
indicators must also be analyzed (e.g., expenditures for food, housing, trans-
portation, education, and discretionary income). While identifying key ele-
ments to be monitored, the key consideration would be to develop a
reasonable frame of reference to gauge the rate of growth and ‘‘critical mass’’
of indicators needed to make Western entry feasible. This is a similar prob-
lem facing organizations attempting to ‘‘crack’’ the base of the pyramid in
the global marketplace (Prahalad 2005).
ASSESSMENT OF KEY MARKET SEGMENTS
Developing a set of ‘‘comparative’’ market segments would entail
identification of potential market segments in the reunified Korea and then
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developing a ‘‘comparative’’ frame of reference that can be used assess the
market potential of each segment. When combining both the North and
South market segments, an ‘‘average’’ market segment must be constructed
to make a comparison to the unified segments in Korea (Levin and Han
2003). This ‘‘hypothetical’’ frame of reference could be based on emerging
markets, other reunified markets, or some combination of the two. This
approach would subjugate the assessors’ point of reference (e.g., their
own market or their preconceived notions about the reunified Korea market)
and provide them with a stable set of segments to compare longitudinally
(Mitchell 2002; Smith 2002).
STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES, OPPORTUNITIES, AND THREATS ANALYSIS OF THE WESTERN
ORGANIZATION
What will it take to be successful in the reunified Korean market? Are the
requirements for success the same as or similar to other Asian markets?
How much time will have to pass after unification for the market to resemble
a normal=typical, unified market in Asia? These are crucial questions to be
answered by the management of the company attempting to enter the reuni-
fied Korean market. A relative competitive advantage will need to be deter-
mined prior to entering the market and, if one is not readily apparent, then it
should signal the management of the Western organization that the risk asso-
ciated with entering the market may be too great. In addition, a short-,
medium-, and long-term orientation to the development of marketing
product=service capabilities needs to be developed to be utilized by the man-
agement=marketing managers in the organization.
DEVELOPMENT OF A STRATEGIC PLAN FOR KOREA
Planning in the face of uncertainty and ambiguous data is a daunting task but
one that is critical for Western firms wanting to enter a unified Korea. The
expressed policies that are to be accomplish need to be articulated and quan-
tified the best they can (given the limited availability of data on the combined
markets). The most difficult issue at this stage of the planning process is to
gain confidence in the data and to find repositories of data that instill a trust
level in the data as well as the plan for entering Korea that management can
make the necessary commitments to the future of doing business in Korea.
The second stage of developing a strategic plan is to articulate the stra-
tegies that will be used to reach the explicit business goals for the Korea mar-
ket. Many of these strategic decisions will be based upon the organizations
perceived willingness=need to form strategic alliances on the Korea penin-
sula. In addition, the recognition that market segments between North and
South will remain bifurcate and remain that way for some time, necessitating
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a dual marketing strategy and the concomitant expenses of implementing
two strategies.
The third stage of the business plan should focus on the cost, personnel,
and time to effectively implement the second stage of the plan. These tactical
decisions are critical, given the ‘‘unknowns’’ relative to the cost and, maybe
more important, in this case the length of time necessary to be effective.
Therefore, it is imperative that the temporal dimensions of each strategy need
to be carefully monitored due to the lack of a sound foundation of data from
which the plan can be developed. The short-, medium-, and long-term time
perspectives need to be assessed to help insure that the plans objects are
being met.
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
The proverbial seeds of change are at work in the Koreas today, where some
form of economic unification between the centrally controlled Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) and the democratic Republic of
Korea (South Korea) seems not impossible within the next 5 to 10 years.
Should the political and economic environment of economically united
Koreas permit entry by foreign interests, the teeming configuration of 73
million Koreans, rich businessmen and impoverished subsistence farmers
all, would provide a tempting consumer base for some forms of diversified
goods. Determining what goods these Koreans would want and how to earn
their trust remains a key question.
Since the Koreas are presently separate and North Korea is all but com-
pletely closed to Western outsiders, a good foundation of data and infor-
mation reflecting demand is immensely difficult to come by. However,
based on the raw data on the combined Koreas, indeed, seems a promising
emerging market with a large population, few natural resources, and hence
some amount of demand for foreign goods. In order to experience any level
of influence or success in a combined Korean market, Western organizations
need to focus their efforts on developing strong partnerships with Chinese
and Korean companies in order to work from the inside to earn Korean trust.
While joint ventures were discussed as a probable course of action ear-
lier in this article, no form of partnership or alliance is without flaws. Joint
ventures are a particularly risky mode of market entry. Despite this level of
risk and the many other apparent barriers to business action in the joined
Koreas, it seems that any measure of success in the potential united emerging
market of North and South Korea would be dependent on some foundation
of trust and acceptance. The idea of conducting business in tumultuous, uni-
ted, yet politically dissimilar markets is immensely risky as well, and follow-
ing through with any sort of market entry plan would demand both skill and
willingness to break from accepted strategy.
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To gain insights as to how to interface with the North Korean consumer
marketplace as well as the ‘‘mysterious’’ government agencies, the following
areas for future research and policy driven activities should be considered:
. Development of joint ventures with South Korean companies: The result-
ing privatization of government properties and economic ventures would
seem to be a logical outcome if unification is to take place (Meyer 2002).
Therefore, companies that feel that the government agencies as well as
certain consumer segments could provide the basis of a market opport-
unity should be explored using local North Korean agencies=organiza-
tions.
. Increase the level of direct foreign investment: Both the public and private
sections need to identify key industrial segments as well as companies that
could benefit from the infusion of capital. Public funding of infrastructure
and schools would look like a potential target of opportunity to
‘‘jump-start’’ the economy, whereas investments in primary industries
(e.g., steel, concrete, extractive industries) could improve economic
options for key industrial segments.
. Development and revitalization of infrastructure keyed to trade with South
Korea: Most economists would argue that developing a modernized infra-
structure in North Korea would be the first step in stimulating the econ-
omy. At the same time, infrastructure tied to trade with South Korea
could go a long way to normalizing relationships and trade.
. Encourage and stimulate cultural=social interactions between South and
North Korea: Given the rich cultural and social tradition of cultural and
social events between the two countries, these events should be rejuve-
nated. This would be an excellent access for NGOs to provide the sponsor-
ship for such events.
Ultimately, the world as we know it will continue to shrink, and globa-
lization will become an ever-more integral facet of international business.
The big players of China and Japan have already leapt onto this world stage.
It has happened before: Germany, in the aftermath of World War II and the
fall of the Berlin wall (1989), was able to come together, assimilate dissimilar
political schemes, and establish the most vibrant, successful economy in the
European Union. In this light, North and South Korea have the potential to
become yet another emerging economy of immense importance. In order
to stay on top, the United States will need not only to react to external forces
of change and globalization but preemptively adopt a proactive stance
toward the changing world. By modifying existing strategies and acting
quickly, building on existing partnerships and laying new foundations of cul-
tural acceptance and trust, Americans could become viable competitors in
just one more of the emerging economies of the future. It is by identifying
these emerging markets, like the potentially merging Korean economies,
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before they make the headlines of BusinessWeek or The New York Times that
companies will be able to reach new markets and stay ahead of the game.
However, remember, ‘‘Be careful, what you wish for; it might come true!’’
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